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Summary
This report considers the relationship between rights and responsibilities within the context of
the ongoing debate on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. In keeping with the commitment
of the Green Paper 2009 to ensure that any increased emphasis on responsibilities in such a
Bill will not erode the protection of rights, this report highlights the potential risks associated
with incorporating responsibilities into Britain’s constitutional framework.

Key research questions
The central question for this report is whether responsibilities can be incorporated into the
existing human rights framework of the United Kingdom (UK) without jeopardising
fundamental human rights safeguards. In seeking to address this question, the report seeks
to develop a rights-based concept of responsibilities. It explores the meaning of responsibility
in the context of human rights, the distinction between responsibilities and duties, and the
ways in which responsibilities have been framed in international and domestic laws. The
report also identifies the potential problems with drawing a direct association between rights
and responsibilities, and explores how existing national and international laws guard against
rights becoming contingent on responsibilities.

Scope and analysis
The report develops its analysis at three levels. First, at the level of political and ideological
analysis, the report examines the origins of the rise of the responsibilities movement, both
internationally and within the UK. Second, at the level of legal analysis, the report surveys
international law provisions regarding individual duties and compares similar examples within
domestic jurisdictions. Finally, the report takes a theoretical approach to the idea of
responsibilities, drawing on well-established legal and moral theories on human rights. The
evidence presented in this report was obtained through an in-depth investigation of primary
sources (legal documents, official publications, parliamentary debates, United Nations (UN)
debates, and publications by relevant non-governmental organisations) as well as academic
literature on rights and responsibilities.

The international responsibilities movement
In its examination of the political and ideological debates surrounding responsibilities, the
report locates the rise of the ‘international responsibilities movement’ in a loose alliance of
communitarians, faith-based critics of human rights, and representatives of certain states
within the UN. The report examines the key arguments and initiatives of this movement,
concluding that the reception of this movement by liberal democratic states has been
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cautious. Moving on from the international sphere, the report also considers the political
factors that have shaped the responsibilities debate in Britain. Although influenced by the
international responsibilities movement, the report suggests that the current domestic interest
in responsibilities is also a consequence of political objections to rights talk on both the left
and the right of the political spectrum. Moreover, the report concludes that the responsibilities
debate in Britain has been associated with efforts to balance rights and security. This is
identified as a risk to rights protection, especially in the absence of a consensus on concrete
proposals for the expression of responsibilities.

Recognition of individual duties
Having examined the political debates surrounding responsibilities both internationally and
domestically, the report next surveys how individual duties have been legally recognised in
international and domestic human rights instruments. Three different mechanisms for
expressing individual duties are identified: duties to respect the rights of others (so-called
correlative duties); duties not to exercise rights contrary to certain state or individual interests
(rights limitations); and freestanding (so-called non-correlative) duties. The report notes that
although most international and domestic human rights instruments accept the idea that
‘rights come with responsibilities’, liberal democratic states have generally been reluctant to
produce definitive lists of duties, either in international law or domestically. Where liberal
states do give expression to individual duties, they have normally confined themselves to
rhetorical statements or clauses that are either non-justiciable or indirectly enforceable. In
contrast, those states that have made explicit provision for justiciable duties in their domestic
constitutions – or have supported such initiatives internationally – tend to be characterised by
authoritarian regimes, either religious or socialist.

Reconciling rights and responsibilities
The final section of the report takes a theoretical perspective and considers the challenges
associated with producing explicit statements about individual duties. In particular, it draws
attention to the central problem of trying to reconcile the entrenchment of duties with the
essential liberal commitment that state action must be justified in light of human rights, and
that citizens should not be required to justify their exercise of these rights. The report
suggests that this commitment must – as a matter of both logic and principle – translate into
a priority of human rights over individual duties, a priority potentially jeopardised by stating
explicit individual duties in a Bill of Rights.
In reaching this conclusion, the report draws an important distinction between duties that are
a necessary logical product of a right (the correlative duties) and duties that are not
correlatives of rights. It is suggested that the incorporation of non-correlative duties poses
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significant risks to the efficacy of rights protection. A further, crucial distinction is drawn
between correlativity and contingency, and the report notes that in order to realise the Green
Paper’s commitment to non-contingency, any enshrined responsibilities (whether correlative
or non-correlative) must not be allowed to become preconditions for the exercise of human
rights. Finally, the report examines the particular difficulties and risks associated with
enforcing duties, in particular those that are too broad to give rise to any specific legal action.

Recommendations
This report ends with three major recommendations. First, there may be value in stating
within any Bill of Rights and Responsibilities a general duty to respect the human rights of
others. Such a duty could serve to reinforce a shared commitment to the importance of rights
and to make clear that the exercise of these rights is constrained by respect for the rights of
others. Such a duty to respect the rights of others is to be preferred to a duty to ‘exercise
rights responsibly’, which confuses the moral appeal of living a responsible life with the
existence of a legally enforceable duty. Moreover, to the extent that the law exists to protect
individual rights, the duty to respect the rights of others might also be said to encompass a
duty to obey the law. In this sense, the duty to respect the rights of others is preferable to the
more coercive and less rights regarding obligation to obey the law.
Secondly, the report suggests that there is little to be gained from – and significant risk
associated with – incorporating lists of specific duties within the body of a Bill of Rights. Any
statement about responsibilities should be general and rhetorical only, and preferably located
within the preamble. This would ensure that such a statement is seen as educative and
aspirational, and also guard against any suggestion that the duty is directly enforceable
against individuals. Finally, if individual duties are to be incorporated into the main body of
any Bill, then precautions must be taken to ensure that the duties remain non-justiciable,
preferably by an explicit statement of non-justiciability.
These proposals seek to ensure that that any future attempt by policymakers to entrench
constitutional responsibilities will be framed by an active commitment to the protection of
human rights. They safeguard against the possibility that the duties incorporated into a Bill of
Rights and Responsibilities will result in an unintentional erosion of human rights protections.
Policymakers are therefore advised to approach the development of duties with caution, in
particular by adopting a variety of explicit safeguards against rights becoming contingent on
responsibilities.
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1.

Introduction

1.1

Aim of the report

The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) placed human rights at the centre of the legal landscape
in the United Kingdom (UK). The Act ‘brought home’ certain rights that had been enshrined in
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), by giving individuals access to these
rights in domestic courts. Over the past two years, however, a new chapter in the political
debate around human rights has begun, culminating most recently in the Green Paper Rights
and Responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework. 1 Central to the Green Paper is
the proposition that the UK might adopt a new Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, which could
aim to capture rights that build on the protections in the HRA but also place a greater
emphasis on ‘responsibilities’.
This report contributes to the debate on the relationship between rights and responsibilities
initiated by the Green Paper by explaining how constitutional duties are currently expressed
in a broader global setting. Furthermore, it outlines the potential risks associated with any
attempt to incorporate responsibilities into the existing constitutional framework of the UK.
The conclusion of the report is that duties are already inherent in human rights, and the risks
of giving duties explicit legal meaning are significant. Any move towards constitutional
recognition of such duties will need to be accompanied by safeguards against the possibility
that they will be invoked with a view to eroding existing human rights protections. Without
such safeguards, the Green Paper’s objective of avoiding contingency cannot be
guaranteed.

1.2

Structure of the report

Following on from this introduction, the report is divided into five main chapters. Chapter 2
examines the rise of the so-called international responsibilities movement, which has been
one of the driving forces behind recent interest in the relationship between rights and
responsibilities. Chapter 3 considers the political factors that have shaped the discussion of
responsibilities in the UK, specifically the background to the publication of the Green Paper
on Rights and Responsibilities. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the ways in which
individual duties have been recognised and expressed in both international and domestic
human rights instruments. Chapter 5 then considers the conceptual difficulties likely to arise
from any attempt to recognise individual duties, and examines their various philosophical and
legal meanings. Chapter 6 summarises the main conclusions of the report and offers some
1

Ibid.

1

cautionary advice to policymakers and legislators about the risks of placing too much
emphasis on duties and responsibilities in the context of human rights.

1.3

Methodology

The research presented in this report was conducted with a view to addressing a number of
important issues raised by the prospect of a new Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.
Following discussions with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in March and April 2008, it was
agreed that the following key questions would provide the basis for the report:



What does responsibility mean in the context of human rights?



Is there a distinction to be drawn between responsibilities and constitutional duties?



How could a rights-based concept of responsibilities be incorporated into the existing
human rights framework?



How have responsibilities and duties been framed in international human rights law?



How have responsibilities and duties been framed in the constitutional documents of
comparable jurisdictions?



How has international and domestic law in comparable jurisdictions safeguarded against
rights becoming contingent on responsibilities?



What are the potential problems of drawing a direct association between rights and
responsibilities?



How would constitutional responsibilities operate within the UK constitutional setting?

As these questions were agreed almost 12 months before the final publication of the Green
Paper on Rights and Responsibilities, much of the work for this report was carried out prior to
the release of the Green Paper in March 2009. Given the broad ranging nature of the report,
our survey of the relevant material was not restricted by date. In practice, however, many of
the human rights documents and academic writings we reviewed were produced in the postwar period. In all other cases, where appropriate the most recent literature on the subject
was selected. Following discussions with MoJ, we initially confined ourselves to examining
academic materials available in English (all of the national and international constitutional
documents were available in English translations). This was due to resource constraints, and
in particular the cost of obtaining professional translations of the relevant foreign language
materials. With the help of graduate researchers trained in the relevant jurisdictions,
however, we did examine a cross-section of the relevant German, Italian, Portuguese, Polish
and Spanish literature on constitutional duties, primarily to confirm the accuracy of our
English language sources.
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The research work began with an in-depth investigative review of the literature review based
on key words associated with the research questions set out above. Initially, the keywords
constitutional duties, constitutional responsibilities, constitutional obligations,
international law duties, international law responsibilities and international law
obligations were used. After reviewing the abstracts of the available literature, the authors
narrowed down the literature selection to pieces that focused on the constitutional duties,
responsibilities and obligations that apply to (or potentially apply to) individuals rather than
states (see section 1.4 below).
The literature review included existing legal provisions in national and international law, as
well as analytical and philosophical examinations of the concept of responsibilities and its
relationship to human rights. The authors did not confine the literature search to publications
within the UK. Rather, we took the view that publications from and about comparable
jurisdictions would be equally valuable in providing policymakers with insight into the way in
which responsibilities and duties have been constitutionally expressed elsewhere. A number
of academic and legal databases were searched in selecting the literature and materials (see
appendix 1). The following sources were included:



books;



peer-reviewed articles;



book chapters;



non-peer-reviewed articles;



official publications (both international and domestic); and



NGO publications.

Once an extensive bibliography had been assembled, the sources were evaluated by
reference to three general inclusion criteria:



scholastic reputation in the field;



political significance in the field (both domestically and internationally); and



particular relevance to subject area.

The research team applied these inclusion criteria in reading the abstracts and executive
summaries of the materials. Where no abstract or summary of the piece existed, the whole
work was read by at least one member of the team (and in many cases by all of them). The
research team then identified, based on their professional judgement, the pieces that were
most relevant to the study. Once the initial material was selected, the research team also
followed up footnoted materials using the same inclusion criteria.
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Following on from this comprehensive review of the available literature, the authors
undertook a detailed examination of all relevant legal documents on duties and
responsibilities. The authors took their initial lead from the materials that had already
surveyed the law in this subject area. However, legal materials were also identified directly
from legal databases (see appendix 1). Using these resources, a list was compiled of
jurisdictions and international law material which included references to duties and
responsibilities. The authors then narrowed down this list further to focus on jurisdictions they
considered comparable with the UK. The authors took the view that comparable jurisdictions
would need in the first instance to be characterised as democratic, liberal states, and should
in addition fall under one of the following inclusion criteria:



Common law jurisdictions;



Member States of the European Union;



Commonwealth jurisdictions;



Anglo-American jurisdictions.

Given that the selection (and exclusion) of all of the material used in this report necessarily
involved making choices about their relevance, reliability and independence, the final report
inevitably reflects the judgements of the authors. In order to ensure that the report presents a
balanced account of the debate on responsibilities, however, a number of independent
academics and legal practitioners were consulted during the drafting process, and they
contributed detailed comments on early versions of the report. Among those consulted during
the drafting process were: Dr Pavlos Eleftheriadis (University of Oxford), Dr Tom Hickman
(Blackstone Chambers), David Petrasek (Amnesty International), Elizabeth Prochaska
(Matrix Chambers), and Professor Jeremy Waldron (New York University). In addition, the
report was also subject to interim and final peer review by MoJ. As a consequence, although
the final report reflects the views and expert judgements of the authors, every effort has been
made to provide a balanced and comprehensive response to both the Green Paper and the
specific research questions set out above.

1.4

Terminology

The terms ‘responsibilities’, ‘duties’ and ‘obligation’ are often used interchangeably, and there
is little real agreement over the meaning of these terms within political debate. Responsibility
has been used both in the sense of ‘acting responsibly’ and in the sense of being under a
duty or obligation to act in a particular way. Similarly, politicians often argue that we should
‘use rights responsibly’ or refer to a ‘duty to obey the law’ as a ‘responsibility’.
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One of the strengths of the Green Paper 2009 lies in the distinction it draws between
‘responsibilities’ and legally enforceable ‘duties’. Early on, it acknowledges that ‘while the law
imposes many duties, it does so in a patchwork way and often without framing them explicitly
in the language of responsibility’ (para. 2.24). Later, the Paper argues that ‘although not
necessarily suitable for expression as a series of new legally enforceable duties, it may be
desirable to express succinctly, in one place, the key responsibilities we all owe as members
of society’ (para. 2.26).
To date, political debates over the meaning of responsibility have been marred by a tendency
to confuse moral arguments about the value of living a responsible life with suggestions that
certain constitutional duties should be enforced by law. Although the term responsibility may
well be a useful way to describe a broader moral attitude to the exercise of rights, the idea of
responsibility should not be taken to be the same as a legal duty. In this report, an effort has
been made to keep these two notions of responsibility (moral and legal) separate, and
throughout the term ‘duty’ is used to refer to a legal obligation and not some broader moral
notion of responsibility.
Finally, it is important to note that this report does not consider the duties owed by a state to
its citizens as a consequence of the assertion of human rights. While a discussion of such
duties is an important part of the debate on constitutional reform, 2 it is beyond the scope of
this report. Instead, this report focuses on the duties owed by individuals to each other, or
owed by individuals to the state or community, as contained in international treaties,
domestic constitutions or domestic statutes (such as the HRA).

2

For a recent and impressive account of the notion of positive duties, see Fredman, 2008.
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2.

The international origins of the ‘responsibilities
movement’

This chapter examines the intellectual and political foundations of the so-called
‘responsibilities movement’. A loose alliance of communitarians, faith-based critics of human
rights, and some state representatives at the United Nations Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC), the responsibilities movement has called for greater emphasis on individual duties
in order to correct a perceived imbalance between rights and responsibilities. It challenges
the idea of freestanding human rights, arguing that any discussion of rights must also
consider notions of responsibility and the dangers of individualism.

2.1

The evidence

Based on an initial review of the available literature on international debates about
responsibilities (see appendix 1), we identified a number of leading works that have traced
the origins of the responsibilities movement, and provided background on various debates on
duties that have taken place at an international level (Daes, 1980; Hodgson, 2003; Knox,
2008; Saul, 2000). Although each of these works advances a particular view on the
relationship between rights and responsibilities, taken together we believe they provide a
balanced account of the field. Using these works as a guide, we also identified and surveyed
all relevant United Nations (UN) documents, including records of debates, as well as the
Inter-Action Council (IAC)’s draft Declaration of Human Responsibilities.

2.2

The communitarian rights critique

Perhaps the most significant intellectual influence on the responsibilities movement,
communitarianism has provided an established philosophical critique of the relationship
between rights and responsibilities. 3 This critique is based on two central claims. The first is
that modern ‘rights talk’ is founded on a destructive individualism that neglects individual
responsibilities and undervalues the social dimension of human life. 4 To correct this
imbalance, proponents argue that human rights regimes should acknowledge and promote
the idea of responsibilities and explicitly recognise their alleged relationship to substantive
rights (Etzioni, 1995).

3

4

The key academic contributors to communitarianism in the US are Mary Ann Glendon (Glendon, 1991) and
Amitai Etzioni (Etzioni, 1995). The writing of David Selbourne has also been influential in the UK (Selbourne,
1994). On the rise of this movement in the UK, see chapter 3.
According to Glendon, for example, ‘buried deep in our rights dialect is an unexpressed premise that we roam
at large in a land of strangers, where we presumptively have no obligation towards others except to avoid the
active infliction of harm’ (Glendon, 1991, p. 7).
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The second claim is that the failure to place responsibilities on a similar footing as rights is
the source of many modern social problems (Saul, 2000). These include the deterioration of
private and public morality, the decline of the family, high crime rates and a tendency to claim
rights while leaving responsibilities to ‘big government’ and the welfare state (Etzioni, 1995;
Selbourne,1994).
Despite its growing importance on the international stage, the communitarian critique is not
without its critics. They take issue with the claim that there has been a decline in individual
moral responsibility coinciding with an increased emphasis on rights. As Ben Saul argues,
the assumption that an increased emphasis on rights has led to a decline in individual moral
responsibility is unsubstantiated. Furthermore, communitarians make repeated reference to
an ‘undefined golden age of moral responsibility from which modern society has fallen’, but it
is not clear ‘whether such an age ever in fact existed’ (Saul, 2000). Moreover,
communitarians have yet to produce any convincing evidence of a causal link between the
rise of rights and the decline of modern society.
Another difficulty with the communitarian critique has been emphasised by Cass Sunstein
(1995), who has questioned whether rights have somehow crowded out responsibilities. In
fact, if anything, the idea of responsibilities has always been part of the social and legal
landscape:
[C]onsider, for example, cigarette smoking; corporate misconduct; air and
water pollution; sexual harassment; and racist and sexist speech. In all of
these areas, people who were formerly autonomous, and free to act in
accordance with their own claim rights, are now subject to socially and
sometimes legally enforced responsibilities (p. 730).
Even if we discount these criticisms, the precise legal implications of the communitarian
critique remain unclear. While commentators such as Amitai Etzioni often restrict themselves
to demanding a moral revival rather than legal reform (Etzioni, 1995), the risk remains that
rhetorical calls to ‘rebalance rights and responsibilities’ may be co-opted by those who wish
to justify novel and unacceptable limitations on long-established rights.

2.3

The international faith-based rights critique

The responsibilities movement has also been driven by an international inter-faith project
that has sought to establish a global ethical standard. In addition to lobbying for an
increased emphasis on responsibilities in international human rights law, members of this
project have also produced a number of documents that set out models of individual duties
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and responsibilities. Released by the Inter-Faith Parliament of the World Religions at its
centenary meeting in 1993, the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic identified certain ‘broad,
ancient guidelines for human behaviour’ common to the world’s religions, stating that
‘action in favour of rights and freedoms presumes a consciousness of responsibility and
duty… [and] rights without morality cannot long endure’ (Parliament of the World’s
Religions, 1993, p. 6).
This faith-based critique was crucial to the development of the IAC’s draft Declaration of
Human Responsibilities (IAC, 1997). Central to this document is a commitment to ideas of
obligation and responsibility, and a belief that greater emphasis needs to be placed on
ethical principles drawn from the world’s major religions. It also maintains that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is incomplete, and that its insistence on an exclusively
Western conception of rights ‘can result in conflict, division and endless dispute, and [its]
neglect of human responsibilities can lead to lawlessness and chaos’ (IAC, 1997, preamble).
The IAC intended that the Declaration be adopted by the UN General Assembly on the 50th
anniversary of the UDHR. It contained 19 articles outlining human duties and responsibilities,
which roughly mirror the UDHR rights (articles 2–20). The articles were supposed to
compliment the UDHR rights by rebalancing rights and duties and encouraging individuals
not to assert rights where doing so would harm others. In other words, the aim was to ensure
that individuals understand that they have a duty to exercise their rights responsibly (Saul,
2000). The draft was discussed in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), with a view to
potential adoption by the UN General Assembly. It did not, however, receive sufficient state
support and never proceeded to a formal vote. The draft was also strongly criticised by
Amnesty International, which argued that the Declaration would undermine long-established
international human rights. According to Amnesty, adoption of the Declaration would result in
the restating of well-established rights in terms of vague and ill-defined responsibilities, and
potentially frame certain rights in weaker and less precise language than that used in the
UDHR (Amnesty International, 1998).

2.4

Shifts in the United Nations and the Martinez Draft
Declaration on Human Social Responsibilities

Alongside the activities of the IAC, signs of a growing interest in human responsibilities
started to emerge in various international forums during the 1990s. In 1995, the UN
Commission on Global Governance published Our Global Neighbourhood, which called on
the international community ‘to unite in support of a global ethic of common rights and shared
global responsibilities’ (chap. 2). Following a motion introduced by Egypt (and sponsored by
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Algeria, China, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Iran and Malaysia) in 1999, the UNHRC (referring
directly to the IAC’s work) mandated a study on human responsibilities (UN, 1999). The
Economic and Social Council then authorised the appointment of a Special Rapporteur,
Miguel Alfonso Martínez (UN, 2001), whose work culminated in a final report and a pre-draft
Declaration on Human Social Responsibilities (Martinez, 2003). This pre-draft Declaration
was eventually rejected by a narrow margin in a vote in the UN Economic and Social Council
(UN, 2005).
The Martinez Report lamented ‘the neglect suffered by human responsibilities’ in
international human rights law, concluding that it was ‘absolutely necessary to create and
develop a new individual and collective awareness of the … balance between the rights of
the individual and his/her social duties or responsibilities’ through a new international
standard (Martinez, 2003, pp. 3–4). Martinez’s rationale mirrors that in the IAC draft
Declaration by suggesting that favouring the rights of the individual leads to ‘conflicts,
divisions and interminable disputes’ (Martinez, 2003, p. 21). Interestingly, Martinez alleged a
clear division between developed countries ‘of the North,’ which he found generally opposed
the formal establishment of any correlation between rights and responsibilities, and those of
the ‘underdeveloped South’, which supported such a connection (Martinez, 2003, p. 8).
However, it should be noted that among the countries that eventually voted against the predraft Declaration were not only Canada, the United States, Japan and the European Union
but also Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal and Turkey (UN, 2005, pp. 8–9).
Like the IAC draft Declaration, the Martinez pre-draft Declaration is ambiguous as regards
the possible legal effect of ‘rebalancing rights and responsibilities’. Despite the fact that both
drafts state that the proposed responsibilities ‘correspond to social ethics and human
solidarity’ and not those ‘dictated by law’ (Martinez, 2003, p. 22), John Knox argues that any
such declaration of responsibilities by the UN could affect how states interpret existing
international human rights standards (Knox, 2008). This certainly appeared to be the view of
the UK representative in the final Economic and Social Council debate, who argued that the
pre-draft Declaration was capable of ‘undermining the very foundations of human rights’ by
implying that ‘the state could determine which rights, if any, an individual might enjoy in
return for the exercise of responsibilities’ (UN, 2005, p. 8). It is with this concern in mind that
state support for such duties has been critically assessed: ‘notwithstanding the undoubted
cultural differences between countries as to the proper balance between rights and duties,
the primary division in the declaration is not between different cultures, but between
democratic and authoritarian governments’ (Knox, 2008, p. 36).

9

2.5

Conclusion

As with the communitarian and faith-based rights critique, the risk here is that some states
may support the international responsibilities movement not because they are keen to
expand or improve upon the existing international rights framework but instead because this
represents an opportunity to introduce new restrictions on human rights. It is for this reason
that the work of the international responsibilities movement has been approached with
caution and with some reticence as to the political – as well as principled – motivations of
those states that have been its most vocal supporters.
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3.

The move to ‘responsibilities’ in the United
Kingdom

This chapter examines the responsibilities movement in the UK, with a view to providing
background to the current debate on the relationship between human rights and
responsibilities. In addition, it provides a political context for some of the key constitutional
questions raised by the Green Paper 2009.

3.1

The evidence

The evidence presented in this part of the report was gathered in a number of distinct stages.
First, we completed a key word search of all relevant databases (see appendix 1) as well as
Hansard to identify any reference to duties or responsibilities by a member of parliament,
government official, or adviser from 1997 to the present. We also searched the online
archives of five national newspapers – The Times, The Guardian, The Telegraph, the
Independent, and the Financial Times – for articles on political statements on the question of
duties and responsibilities. We also completed a keyword search of political party
publications and speeches made by representatives of the major political parties in the UK.
Although this produced a long list of references, statements, and articles (over 100), the
overwhelming majority lacked depth and provided little in the way of a detailed discussion of
the relevant issues. Looked at together, however, they did provide us with a useful overview
of the way in which the political debate on the relationship between rights and responsibilities
has developed over the past decade, and provided a general background to the issues
raised in the Green Paper. In constructing our account of the background to the political
discussions that have surrounded rights, we also relied on two leading analyses of
constitutional politics in the UK (Griffiths, 1991; Loughlin, 1992).
Following this broad survey, we then conducted a detailed review of two recent reports on
rights published by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) (JCHR Report, 2005-6;
JCHR Report, 2007–08a), focusing our attention on those sections that discussed the issue
of responsibilities. These reports were selected for their rigour, and because they offer a
detailed and independent account of the relevant issues. We also read and reviewed all of
the material cited by the Committee in each report. Finally, following the publication of the
Green Paper in March 2009, we also reviewed all of the material cited and discussed in the
Paper.
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3.2

A Bill of Rights and Responsibilities?

Over the past few years, an ‘unusual cross-party consensus’ on the need for a new ‘British
Bill of Rights’ has arisen in the UK (JCHR Report, 2007–08a, para. 1). Despite considerable
disagreement over what such a Bill might include, the Labour government and the
Conservative opposition both share a commitment to balancing rights with ‘responsibilities’. A
recent parliamentary JCHR report characterised the Government’s use of ‘responsibilities’ as
a rhetorical device through which to defend human rights to a population unfamiliar with or
hostile to rights (JCHR Report, 2007–08a, para. 263):
[T]he Government’s interest in ‘responsibilities’, like its interest in
characterising the rights in the Human Rights Act as ‘British’, is primarily for
presentational reasons: it is motivated by a concern to educate the public.
In the view of the JCHR, government ministers have now turned their attention to
responsibilities and duties, having previously ‘failed to explain the basic philosophy of the
Human Rights Act to the people’ (JCHR Report, 2007–08a, Francesca Klug Ev. 1).
However, the growing emphasis on ‘responsibilities’ in the UK is not simply a ‘presentational’
political attempt to educate a public distrustful of rights. On the one hand, this movement
towards responsibilities is a reflection of the broader international movement outlined in
chapter 2 of this report. In arguing for a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, the Labour
government has frequently referred to other jurisdictions that have adopted the
‘responsibilities’ model (MoJ, 2009). 5 Similarly, in its document on the British Bill of Rights
and Obligations, the Conservative Liberty Forum refers to the IAC Draft Declaration on
Human Responsibilities (Fisher, 2006). On the other hand, the conditions in the UK that have
given rise to the ‘responsibilities’ movement are also locally generated. The movement
reflects deeper political traditions on both the left and right of British politics that were already
evident when the HRA was introduced.
Labour’s support for the HRA represented a significant departure from the party’s traditional
approach to constitutional rights. Not only had Labour been reluctant to entrench the power
of a conservative judiciary (Griffiths, 1991), but socialists had traditionally viewed rights as
dangerously ‘individualist’ and ‘atomistic’ (Loughlin, 1992, p. 197f). This view was reflected in
Jack Straw’s statement in Parliament during the passage of the HRA that ‘there can be no
rights without responsibilities, and our responsibilities should precede our rights’ (House of
Commons, 1998a).

5

See also JCHR Report, 2007–08b, Jack Straw Ev. 78.
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Conservatives have also commonly expressed concern that rights have a moral and social
danger because they lead to atomism, individualism and a break down of social cohesion
(Willets, 2006, cited in Fisher, 2006). This concern was evident in the objections voiced by
Conservative critics at the time the HRA was introduced into Parliament. John Gummer MP,
for example, argued at the committee stage of the Bill, ‘I am unhappy about the concept of
rights; I happen to believe that we have obligations, and that in our obligations lie other
people’s rights’ (House of Commons, 1998b).

3.3

Recent debates and recurring doubts

The doubts expressed when the HRA was debated in Parliament have not disappeared.
While the HRA has been characterised by the Government as ‘a received part of our
constitutional arrangements’ (JCHR Report, 2007–08b, Jack Straw Ev. 78), the concern that
rights have led to unlimited individualism with the potential to erode communal bonds
continues to exist.
Not only is this concern evident in the Green Paper 2009 (MoJ, 2009, pp. 8–9, chap. 2), but it
is reflected in the broader constitutional debate. Both the Labour and Conservative parties
have sought to place ‘responsibilities’ and the rejection of perceived unbridled individualism
at the centre of their political legacies. 6 Thus, Gordon Brown, when proposing the
development of a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, has argued that the ‘British
interpretation of liberty … rejects the selfishness of extreme libertarianism and demands that
the realm of individual freedom encompasses not just some but all of us’ (Brown, 2007).
The Conservative Party is even more emphatic. It has placed ‘responsibility’ at the centre of
its vision of ‘Modern Conservatism’ (Cameron, 2006b; Osborne, 2006). In his foreword to
Built to Last, the Conservative Party’s summary of its aims and values, David Cameron
called for a ‘responsibility revolution’ (Conservative Party, 2006). Equally, the Conservative
Liberty Forum and the Conservative Lawyers Association have cast Thatcherism as a
libertarian deviation from the true Conservative legacy, arguing that ‘the importance of civic
responsibility has lain at the heart of Conservative thinking for the last 200 years’ (Fisher,
2006).

6

Not all political parties have turned to ‘responsibilities’ in this pursuit, however. The Liberal Democratic Party’s
document on constitutional change For the People By the People uses the word ‘responsibilities’ mainly in
relation to state duties to its citizens. Only in one paragraph is the word mentioned in the context of a criticism
of the Government’s model of ‘active citizenship’, arguing that the government needs to develop greater
incentives for citizen participation rather than imposing a responsibility of participation on citizens (Liberal
Democrat, 2007, para. 7).
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The Labour Government and the Conservative opposition have, to differing degrees, also
cast ‘responsibilities’ as a means of balancing the protection of rights with the pursuit of
security. For Cameron, one of the main arguments for a Bill of Rights is the possibility of
providing judicial guidance when ‘the lack of responsibility of some individuals [threatens] the
rights of others’ (Cameron, 2006a). The Labour Government has also been criticised for
making this link between responsibilities and security (JCHR Report, 2005–06; JCHR Report,
2007–08a, para. 262), most notably in the paper Governance of Britain (MoJ, 2007, para.
210). It is interesting to note therefore that the Green Paper 2009 places great emphasis on
the link between security and a new Bill of Rights (MoJ, 2009, foreword, para. i, chap. 1).

3.4

Conclusion

In summary, the responsibilities movement in the UK has been influenced by the
international responsibilities movement as well the broader political culture on both the left
and right of British politics. It is also associated with an attempt to balance rights and
security. Although the Green Paper 2009 states that ‘fundamental rights cannot be legally
contingent on the exercise of responsibilities’ (MoJ, 2009, p. 17), there is as yet no concrete
policy proposal on the table as to how responsibilities might be reflected either in a Bill of
Rights or our social institutions. This absence of clarity is viewed as problematic by the
JCHR, who fear that the concept will be used against the development of a human rights
regime in a broader political environment antipathetic to rights and increasingly concerned
with security (JCHR Report, 2007–08a). In short, the constitutional emphasis on
‘responsibilities’ remains contested in the UK.
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4.

Individual duties and responsibilities in
international and domestic law

This report has described how the notion of responsibilities has gradually become a focus for
discussions about the future of human rights both internationally and in the UK. In this
chapter, we examine how individual duties have been expressed in international and
domestic law. The second section explores the background of a number of key international
human rights instruments, while the next considers various domestic constitutional
references to individual duties.
Typically, we can identify three different ways of expressing individual duties:

1 duties to respect the rights of others (correlative duties);
2 duties not to exercise rights contrary to certain state or individual interests
(rights limitations); and

3 freestanding (non-correlative) duties.
While states vary in their approaches, there has been a general reluctance within liberal
democratic states and under international law to set out definitive lists of freestanding duties.
When states do seek to emphasise duties or ‘frame them explicitly in the language of
responsibility’ (MoJ, 2009, p. 9), they have normally confined themselves to rhetorical
statements or general clauses.

4.1

The evidence

For the purposes of this section, we undertook a broad key word search (see appendix 1) to
identify any international treaties and instruments, as well as constitutions in comparable
jurisdictions that refer to duties and responsibilities. Given that few international human rights
instruments predate the establishment of the UN in 1948, for the purposes of our review we
confined ourselves to the post-war period (1945 onward). We also examined any available
supporting documentation – such as UN debates and preparatory documents – relating to
the instruments, and a number of leading academic commentaries in the field (Knox, 2008;
Morsink, 1999; Petrasek, 1999). With respect to domestic constitutions, we were guided in
the first instance by the comparability of the jurisdiction (see section 1.3 above), although we
do occasionally refer to non-comparable jurisdictions (eg China and Cuba) as a counterpoint.
Once identified as comparable, we examined the leading academic commentaries on the
constitutions of each particular jurisdiction.
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4.2

International human rights instruments

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
Although the UDHR does not set out the duties owed by individuals to the state or
community, article 29(1) contains a general statement of principle regarding the role of
individual duties in international human rights:
[E]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.
Following lengthy discussions during the UDHR drafting process state delegates agreed to
limit any reference to duties to those owed to the community rather than exclusively to the
state. 7 There was considerable discussion as to how these duties should be expressed.
Although various countries from Latin America (as well as Egypt and China) wanted the
UDHR to include a list of individual duties, countries such as France and the UK argued
instead that a statement of general principle was adequate. In the end this latter approach
prevailed and is reflected in the final text of article 29(1) (Morsink, 1999; Petrasek, 1999).
Individual duties also find expression through the general limitation clause in article 29(2),
which states:
[I]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
This clause lays down the boundaries within which a state may create individual duties in
domestic law that limit UDHR rights.

International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
The statement of principle on individual duties contained in the UDHR was also adopted in
the preamble to both the ICCPR and ICESCR. Both preambles state: ‘the individual, having
duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of … rights’.

7

This section draws on the discussions during the intricate 8-stage drafting process of the UDHR. The various
UN documents connected to this discussion are cited and considered in Petrasek (1999).
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The rationale for these individual duties was summarised by the Australian delegate during
the ICCPR drafting process: ‘states being the sum of individuals, the latter must co-operate if
the Covenant was to be implemented’ (Petrasek, 1999). This individual duty to promote
human rights was recently reaffirmed and developed in the ‘Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. This declaration was
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1998 (see appendix 2). Interestingly, efforts to insert
a detailed list of individual duties into this Declaration were resisted by many democratic
states. Although they acknowledged the importance of duties, democratic states feared that
specific duties might be employed to undermine the rights of individuals (Knox, 2008).

The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) mentions individual duties only in the
most general terms and omits reference to duties owed to the state. The main reference to
duties can be found in article 32(1), which states that ‘every person has responsibilities to his
family, his community, and mankind’. This represents a significant retreat from the 1948
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRD), which devoted an entire
chapter to individual duties (see appendix 2). It appears that the revised ACHR grew out of a
concern that the general provision in the ADRD, taken together with the specified duties,
allowed states to render enumerated rights contingent upon responsibilities (Knox, 2008).

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
It is clear from the travaux preparatoire (preparatory work) that a consensus existed at the
time of drafting that ‘each right carried with it a corresponding duty’ (ECHR Travaux
Preparatoires, 1949–51a). This consensus is reflected in the rights limitations clauses
contained in the Convention, including articles 8(2), 9(2) and 11(2). The ECHR makes only
one explicit reference to individual duties in article 10(2). This states that the exercise of
freedom of expression ‘carries with it duties and responsibilities’. Although the drafters
generally left duties implicit in the Convention, they nonetheless felt that the danger
associated with the ‘powerful influence [that] the modern media ... exerted upon the minds of
men and upon national and international affairs’ was sufficient to justify an explicit statement
of the special duties under article 10(2).
Looking beyond the specific limitations contained in article 10, article 17 forbids the use of
rights to injure the rights of others and can thus be seen as a codification of the idea of social
responsibility (Sedley, 2008, p. 330; see appendix 2). While, the traveaux preparatoires
make reference to discussions of implied and corresponding duties (ECHR Travaux
Preparatoires, 1949–51b), article 17 has not been prominent in the jurisprudence of the
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European Court of Human Rights. Instead, the Court regards the article’s general purpose as
restricted ‘to prevent[ing] totalitarian groups exploiting in their own interests the principles
enunciated in the Convention’ (Norwood, para. 64). In most other contexts, the specific rights
limitation provisions have been regarded as adequate for the purpose of protecting individual
duties (eg United Communist Party of Turkey and Refah Partisi).

The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
The

African Charter on Human and People’s Rights differs from the majority of international

instruments in providing an extensive list of individual duties in article 29 (see appendix 2).
These expand on the statement in article 27 that ‘every individual shall have duties towards
his family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the
international community’.
This focus on duties in the African Charter is frequently said to be a product of a ‘firmly
ingrained … African tradition’ (Gittleman, 1984, cited in Knox, 2008). The report of the
meeting that drafted the African Charter recorded the view that the perceived Western liberal
conception of the individual as ‘completely free and completely irresponsible, and at all times
in opposition with society, does not conform with African philosophy’ (cited in Petrasek,
1999). However, the Charter is also unquestionably a product of drafting compromises
drawing on ‘responsibilities to the community in African tradition, neo-Marxist obligations (at
the insistence of Mozambique and Ethiopia) and the needs of post-colonial, modern African
states’ (Saul, 2000).
As with the ADRD, significant concerns have been expressed regarding the potential for
states to use Charter duties as a justification for suppressing human rights. The chapter on
duties has been described as ‘an invitation to the imposition of unlimited restrictions on the
enjoyment of rights’ (Buergenthal, 1988, cited in Knox, 2008). This is because the restrictions
on states’ ability to limit rights in the Charter are extremely weak and vague. Article 27(2)
simply states that ‘the rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest’. This fails to
prevent states from relying on the broad article 29 duties to inform the scope of the ‘morality’
and ‘common interest’ limbs of the limitation clause, thus risking rendering rights contingent
on responsibilities of uncertain scope (Knox, 2008).

4.3

Individual duties and responsibilities in domestic
constitutions

As useful as international examples might be, the most revealing illustrations of individual
duties can be found in the domestic context. Contrary to claims of the international
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responsibilities movement, domestic human rights instruments do not reject or ignore the
popular idea that ‘rights come with responsibilities’.

Implicit duties
As in the case of international human rights law, most Western liberal democratic
constitutional texts do not typically contain such expressly stated ‘duties’. As most domestic
rights are qualified by reference either to the rights of others or to fundamental state interests
(such as public order, public safety, national security, etc), duties are normally regarded as
inherent to the right itself (Hodgson, 2003; Saul, 2000). Duties also arise implicitly when
rights contained in the same text compete (for example, freedom of speech and the right to
privacy).
Alternatively, duties may arise as a consequence of the horizontal application of rights
between citizens. Once a jurisdiction recognises the possibility that rights may apply between
private individuals, then duties between individuals will naturally and implicitly arise as a
consequence of the exercise of a right. 8 Liberal democratic constitutions also typically
attempt to capture the social aspect of rights via the promotion of a particular conception of
the individual rights bearer. For example, a communitarian conception of the individual rights
bearer has been expressed by the German Federal Constitutional Court, which has argued
that the ‘image of man under the Basic Law is not that of the isolated sovereign individual;
rather, the Basic Law resolves the conflict between the individual and the community by
binding the citizen to the community without detracting from his intrinsic value’ (BVerfGE 12,
45, 51; 28, 175, 189).
In short, given the range of duties that arise implicitly as a consequence of the exercise of
constitutional rights, there are few compelling reasons to outline such duties expressly in a
Bill of Rights or constitution in a liberal democracy.
The explicit expression of duties has also been regarded by many as giving rise to
considerable risks, as evidenced by the historic and contemporary abuse of individual duties
by authoritarian dictatorships (Saul, 2000; Kirby, 2003), most notably the USSR and China.
This also explains why there is a consistent and deep belief that constitutional human rights
protections are, and ought to be, thought of primarily as safeguards against the state
(Sedley, 2008). As the Federal Republic of Germany pointed out in its representations to the
UN in 1976, rights ‘protect the individual against any abuse of power by the state’, whereas
‘[t]he state and the community with their inherent monopoly of power, can protect themselves

8

It is beyond the scope of this report to enter into the intricacies of the difference between direct and indirect
horizontal effect, or to examine the variety of ways in which horizontality is understood in different jurisdictions.
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against dereliction of duty and abuses of the law by individual citizens. For this reason, the
rights of the community vis-à-vis the individual and the individual’s duties corresponding to
these rights do not need to be protected and given institutionalized safeguards in the same
way as human rights’ (Daes, 1980).

Explicit duties and responsibilities
Although many Western liberal democratic states have been reluctant to articulate duties
explicitly, there are some states in which individual duties have been expressly stated.
Normally such states are characterised by authoritarian regimes, either religious or socialist
(Knox, 2008; Hodgson 2003; Ife, 2005; Daes, 1980). It must be noted, however, that the
explicit articulation of individual duties has also been accepted to differing degrees and for
differing reasons by liberal democratic states such as Australia, India, Italy, Germany, Spain,
South Africa, Portugal and Poland (see appendix 3).
Whether we choose to distinguish between jurisdictions along regional, political or religious
lines, it is clear from the voting records on the draft UDHR that certain states have
consistently supported the entrenchment of individual duties and the broader ‘responsibilities
agenda’. These states can reasonably be described as having authoritarian tendencies and
include Algeria, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran,
Malaysia, Russia and Saudi Arabia (UN, 1999; UN, 2005; Saul, 2000; Knox, 2008). The
majority of these states also have explicitly articulated conceptions of individual duties within
their national constitutional systems.
Explicit duties typically find expression in three forms. The first is in a purely rhetorical
manner either in titles or preambular clauses. The second is through general and frequently
vague propositions. The third form is specifically articulated duties or lists of duties owed by
individuals to the state.
Rhetorical references to duties
Some of the best examples of an attempt to give rhetorical recognition to the idea of duties
can be found in Australia. Although Australia does not yet have a national Bill of Rights, 9 in
recent years Australian states and territories have begun to introduce human rights
legislation. Notably, and despite some Australian affinity with the international
responsibilities movement, the only mention of responsibilities in the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) Human Rights Act 2004 is in the preamble (see appendix 3). Similarly, the
only substantive mention of responsibilities in the subsequently enacted Victorian Charter

9

A consultation is now ongoing regarding the possibility of a Federal Bill of Rights.
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of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 is in the preamble and the title itself (see appendix 3).
The Victorian Equality Opportunity and Human Rights Commission have argued that these
references are not meant to have any substantive legal effect. Rather, ‘over time the
Charter will help to change attitudes so that we all understand that rights come with
responsibilities – including the responsibility to respect other people’s rights’. 10
In response to the ACT Human Rights Act 2004, a Bill of Responsibilities was tabled in the
ACT Legislative Assembly drawing on the IAC Universal Declaration discussed in chapter 2
above. This Bill was debated but, without the support of the governing Labor Party, was
defeated (ACT, 2004; Kostakidis-Lianos & Williams, 2005). As a consequence, to date
constitutional references to the responsibilities of individuals in Australia is limited to largely
symbolic, rhetorical and educative statements.
General clauses on duties
A number of constitutions contain clauses that make general statements about individual
duties (see appendix 3). These clauses vary in their specificity and in the obligations they
impose. For example, the Cuban Constitution contains the rather broad general duty of
‘caring for public and social property, observing work discipline, respecting the rights of
others, observing standards of socialist living and fulfilling civic and social duties’. Vaguer,
and therefore perhaps less onerous, is the South African constitutional provision imposing
‘duties and responsibilities of citizenship’ on ‘all citizens’, which to date has yet to be
discussed by the South African courts. As the JCHR points out, the purpose of the South
African clause is highly unclear (JCHR, 2007–08a). A more anodyne example of a general
clause can be found in the Portuguese Constitution, which holds citizens as ‘bearers of the
rights’ and ‘subject to the duties laid out in the Constitution’. This provision only serves to
reinforce the specific provisions laid out in the Constitution.
Specific duties
The third way in which individual duties arise is in the form of lists of specific duties owed by
individuals to the state. Often stated that entrenched extensive lists of individual duties are
authoritarian in character, the most extreme examples of this being the constitutions of the
People’s Republic of China and the former USSR (see appendix 3). A number of liberal
democracies have also incorporated individual duties in their constitutions. While some like
Germany confine themselves to a single specific provision (parental duties), others
incorporate in their constitutions lists of duties (India, Portugal, Italy, Poland, Spain). There is
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considerable variation in both the length and detail contained in these lists. Likewise, there is
some variation across jurisdictions as to the enforceability of these constitutional duties. (A
full list of the provisions in each country is contained in appendix 3.)
The German constitution contains only one provision containing an explicit duty. Article 6(2)
provides that ‘the care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty
primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the performance of this
duty’. This duty has been considered by constitutional theorists and the German Federal
Constitutional Court to provide an inherent limitation upon the right to found a family. Thus,
the Court has repeatedly argued that the right to found a family is limited by and interpreted
in light of the duty to protect the welfare of the child. The constitutional duty to protect the
welfare of the child also provides grounds for specific statutory obligation that can be directly
imposed upon individuals (Jarass & Pieroth, 2002).
Other democratic constitutions contain more extensive lists of duties which go beyond single
limitations of related rights. In these jurisdictions, however, the duties are rarely viewed as
directly enforceable upon individuals. In Spain, for example, the duties contained in the
different sections of the Constitution are generally regarded by constitutional lawyers as nonjusticiable and incapable of being directly enforced. As such, they are frequently described
as ‘improper duties’, insofar as they address public institutions rather than citizens and in the
Spanish context are treated as statements of general principle (Rubio Llorente, 2001; Pérez
Royo, 2000).
A similar attitude to the role and enforcement of duties is shown in Portugal. Duties contained
in the Constitution are viewed as directly applicable only in exceptional cases (for example,
the duty to educate your children) and typically require specific legislation before they can be
enforced (Canotilho, 1998). Similarly, in Poland duties are regarded as too general to be
directly imposed upon individuals and essentially declaratory in nature. Hence, constitutional
duties are viewed as forming the legal source of individual statutory duties, while also
providing interpretive guidance for the statutory provision in question. Polish commentators
have also been clear that these duties cannot form the conditions for the exercise of any of
the rights and liberties included in the Polish Constitution (Winczorek, 2000).
In contrast, in Italy the duties contained in the Constitution are not regarded as ‘improper’.
Instead, constitutional lawyers argue that these duties apply directly to individuals rather than
institutions and therefore impose real obligations on these individuals (De Vergottini, 2001).
In this sense, duties are more than statements of principle. However, because the duties
contained in the Italian Constitution are expressed in general terms, in practice the content of
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these duties has been shaped by legislation. As a consequence, despite having a different
constitutional status the practical impact of duties in the Italian context resembles that in
Spain, Portugal and Poland – in other words, they serve as a justification for the enactment
of specific legislation.
Perhaps the most extensive list of duties can be found in the Indian Constitution (see
appendix 3). The inspiration for this list was the socialist Constitution of the Soviet Union.
However, whereas the European constitutions containing individual duties leave
constitutional lawyers to argue the case against direct enforceability, Article 37 of the Indian
Constitution states explicitly that such duties are not to be regarded as directly enforceable
(Subba Rao, 1992; Basu, 1973; Shukla, 1990). As various commentators have observed, the
primary function of these duties is ‘educative and evocative’ (Subba Rao, 1992), but as Basu
(1973) has explained, the ‘courts may ... look at the duties while interpreting equivocal
statutes which admit of two constructions ... or in interpreting the ambit of the fundamental
rights themselves’.

A general overview of individual duties recognised in domestic constitutions
can be seen below: 11

11



duty in respect of the family, including parental duties (Iran, South Korea,
Venezuela, Germany, Gabon, Senegal, USSR, Italy);



duty to acquire a basic formal education (China, Thailand, Dominican
Republic, Venezuela);



duty to work (Portugal, Italy, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, USSR, China,
North Korea, Philippines, Venezuela, Egypt, South Korea);



duty to defend country/perform military service (Portugal, China, North
Korea, Poland, Cuba, Thailand, South Korea, Morocco, Iran, Spain, Egypt,
Turkey, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Finland, Italy);



duty to pay taxes (China, Venezuela, Thailand, Egypt, Spain, Morocco, Italy,
Turkey);



duty to vote (Cuba, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Italy, Australia);



duty to preserve certain values (China, Thailand);



duty to protect the environment (Thailand, USSR, Portugal, Spain, Japan).

This list is a brief survey of a number of countries that include specific duties in their constitutional texts. It is
based on a more comprehensive study undertaken by Hodgson (2003). See also appendix 3.
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4.4

Conclusion

The international and comparative analysis in this section demonstrates that duties and
responsibilities have not been ignored at either the international or domestic level. However,
statements of individual duties can take a variety of forms ranging from implicit duties arising
from rights limitation clauses to explicitly enforceable duties. Jurisdictions with liberal
democratic traditions tend, on the whole, towards implicit or rhetorical recognition of duties.
When such constitutions or documents do expressly articulate duties, they normally do so
either explicitly with a rights limitation clause (for example, article 10(2) ECHR and article
6(2) of the German Constitution) or in the form of indirectly enforceable statements (Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Poland). In contrast, it is more common to find extensive lists of directly
enforceable individual duties in constitutions with a strong authoritarian or socialist element
(for example, the People’s Republic of China).
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5.

A critical examination of individual duties

This chapter examines the moral foundation of human rights, the relationship between rights
and duties, and the extent to which duties can be meaningfully expressed in law. 12 In
particular, we consider whether it is possible or desirable to develop a model of individual
duties with legal force.

5.1

The evidence

There is a vast body of literature on human rights, a great deal of which touches only
tangentially on the issue of duties. In section 1.3 and appendix 1, we explain how we
identified relevant books and articles based on a key word search of a wide array of
databases and legal resources, and the criteria we used to decide whether to include or
exclude particular works. Using our professional judgement, we identified the works of a
number of leading rights theorists – such as Robert Alexy, Ronald Dworkin, Neil
MacCormick, Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron – which were then used to guide our account
of the relationship between rights and duties. It is important to note, however, that aside from
Wesley Hohfeld few writers in the fields of legal philosophy or human rights have focused
exclusively on the issue of duties. As a consequence, much of this section draws extensively
on Hohfeld’s analysis and works that have challenged his seminal account of the relationship
between rights and duties.

5.2

The moral foundation of human rights

Contemporary thinking on the moral foundation of human rights stems from the liberal
theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Waldron, 2005), which played a central
role in the struggle against political absolutism. Theorists such as Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau
and Montesquieu were part of a movement to create a political order in which states are
constrained by the recognition of the freedom and equality of citizens. The idea that a
citizen’s natural rights require protection from the state, and the state requires no such
protection from individuals, remains central to liberal democratic philosophy.
After the Second World War and the extreme abuses of individual rights under the Third
Reich, the idea of natural rights was reinvigorated and transformed into the notion of human
rights. The founding of the UN and the adoption of the UDHR point to the central role that
human rights played in the establishment of a post-war world order. This order was premised
on a liberal theory of the individual’s primacy over the state (Weston, 1992, in Steiner, Alston,

12

See also the introduction to chapter 4 of this report.
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& Goodman, 2007). The consequence of this principle is that state action must be justified in
the light of human rights, while citizens do not need to justify or persuade the state that their
human rights need to be respected (Dworkin, 1977). Citizens are bearers of human rights
merely by virtue of the fact of being human.
While the moral recognition of human rights is one thing, rights will obtain legal protection
only when they are recognised in law. What this legal incorporation implies is that the basic
tenets of liberal rights philosophy have been accepted by the democratic authorities enacting
these laws. It should therefore come as no surprise that the majority of democratic states do
provide some legal protection for human rights.

5.3

The relationship between rights and duties

In the field of law, most jurisprudential discussions of the relationship between rights and
duties begin with the analytical work of Wesley Hohfeld, who argued that rights both confer a
legal advantage (as ‘claim rights’) and carry with them correlative duties (Hohfeld, 1923).
According to Hohfeld, because the exercise of a right necessarily entails requiring someone
to act (or refrain from acting) in a particular way, it follows that the right must also impose
some form of duty. Applying Hohfeld to the human rights context, we can see that the
correlative duty of a legal right is placed on the state. For example, the ECHR right to life
imposes a correlative negative duty upon states to refrain (except in strictly limited
circumstances) from taking the lives of individuals. In strictly legal terms, correlativity such as
this between a claim right and a corresponding duty is the test of whether a legal stipulation
is a ‘right in the strict sense’ (Hohfeld, 1923).
Contemporary legal theory has now produced a richer account of rights than one based on
purely legal relationships between rights and duties. 13 Indeed, most legal theorists now agree
that it is more useful to view rights – particularly human rights - as giving rise to a ‘cluster’ of
duties and obligations. These might stop the state, or private parties, from interfering in
individual freedom, or they might require action or resource allocation in order for the right to
be fulfilled (Fredman, 2008). These contemporary accounts of rights also draw on moral
theory to capture the justificatory nature of human rights. Hence, human rights are viewed as
the moral and political reasons for the imposition of rights-based duties, and as such rights
have a logical priority over duties (Eleftheriadis, 2008). Duties exist, in other words, because

13

It is impossible to convey the intricacies and complexity of this theoretical debate in this setting. The theorists
most prominent in this debate are Robert Alexy, Ronald Dworkin, Neil MacCormick, Joseph Raz and Jeremy
Waldron. For a full account of the critique of Hohfeld’s work on legal relations, see Eleftheriadis, 2008, chap.
6. For further texts on rights theory, see also references.
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rights create the moral and political grounds for their existence. According to this view, once
human rights are incorporated into law, the logical priority of rights over duties is accepted.
At this philosophical level, the notion that ‘duties precede rights’ or that rights stem from
duties (HC, 1998a, Straw; HC Committee, 1998b, Gummer) is inconsistent with the liberal
proposition that rights have a necessary priority over duties. This is a point that has been
made by Asbjørn Eide, President of the Advisory Committee on the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, who has argued that
‘[h]uman duties should be derived from human rights, and their sole purpose should be to
strengthen the respect and protection of human rights’ (Eide, 1999). At the level of legal
theory, unless duties are seen as correlatives of rights and are clearly seen as subject to
established rights, they will in essence signify a rejection of liberalism (respect for the
individual and an insistence that state coercion must be justified).
Political arguments that duties precede rights can therefore have real consequences for
constitutional and legal structures. They are not just rhetorical assertions. They challenge the
liberal values that underpin human rights. In short, a real risk exists that a freestanding
discourse around duties that is not concerned with rights will (whether we want it to or not)
end up undermining rights. The remainder of this chapter therefore seeks to evaluate how
‘duties’ might be expressed while remaining consistent with a liberal rights project.

5.4

Types of duties

Implicit individual duties to exercise rights in certain ways
As explained in chapter 4, the limitations placed on human rights can be regarded as implied
duties, specifically to exercise a given right with regard to the rights of others and certain
fundamental state interests (such as public order, public safety and national security). Where
we recognise such duties, the limitations they impose must be clearly laid down in legislation.
For example, the right to free speech in article 10(1) ECHR might be reasonably and
proportionately restricted by a law preventing the incitement of racial hatred. Such a law
could be seen as giving expression to an implicit duty not to abuse freedom of expression to
incite racial hatred. It is important to be very clear that absolute rights, such as the article 3
ECHR prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, cannot be limited and
thus cannot be said to carry any such implicit individual duty.
The practice of implying individual duties through limitation clauses on qualified rights is
unobjectionable from the perspective of a rights-based approach. This is because it simply
defines and establishes the scope of well-understood restrictions on qualified rights.
Furthermore, the practice does not undermine the status of the qualified right. It is important
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to distinguish this category of implicit individual duties, which arise as a result of the exercise
of rights, from both correlative and non-correlative duties, which may arise both in the
exercise of rights and in other circumstances.

Correlative and non-correlative duties
Legal theorists now argue that, from a rights perspective, other individual duties can be
broadly divided into two categories: correlative (perfect) and non-correlative (imperfect)
duties (Eleftheriadis, 2008, chap. 6). Of the two types of duty, correlative duties are the most
easily understood. Both the right to life and the right to property are good examples of rights
that give rise to correlative duties and would clearly lack meaning unless the law imposed
and enforced these duties. By making murder and theft crimes, the law aims to ensure that
these rights are respected and that individuals understand that they have a duty not to
infringe them.
In contrast, non-correlative duties may exist in the absence of a specific right or may be more
broadly expressed than rights to which they relate. Where a duty arises from a correlative
right, the primary reason for enforcing the duty in law is to ensure that the individual right is
protected and respected. That right will therefore define the ambit of the duty. Moreover,
because such an anchoring right will itself be limited by the recognition of other rights, the
duties that flow as a consequence will in turn be rights regarding. For example, the right to
respect for privacy necessarily places limits on the right to freedom of expression. The duties
that flow from these rights will as a consequence be defined by such rights-based limitations.
However, in the case of non-correlative duties, the absence of underlying rights means that
this rationale for enforcing a duty disappears, and with it the inherent constraints on that duty.
The non-correlative duty is owed to the state alone, and the rationale for imposing that duty
is either disconnected from any right or is broader ranging than ensuring the protection of an
individual right. An example of a non-correlative duty disconnected from any right is
contained in article 29(2) of the African Charter, which states that an individual must ‘serve
his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service’.
Non-correlative duties may, however, bear some relationship to recognised human rights.
One example of such a duty might be the duty to defend your country through military
service. While this is not an individual duty directly correlative on an individual right, it might
be argued that imposing such a duty is an indirect means by which the state discharges its
positive duty to protect the right to life of individuals. What is important here, however, is that
an individual’s right to life would not be infringed merely because the state did not impose
such a duty or because an individual failed to fulfil their duty to undertake military service.
The absence of a direct relationship between the individual’s right to life and the duty to
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undertake military service gives rise to indeterminacy as to the scope of the duty and the
extent to which it can be understood in terms of the right to life. Does the right require an
individual to serve in the military for ten years to discharge his or her duty? Would two years
be enough? The answer is evidently not as clear as it might be, for example, when we argue
that an individual has a clear and directly correlative moral duty not to murder another
individual by virtue of their right to life.
Some non-correlative duties are difficult to attach to rights at all. For example, a more
explicitly freestanding duty might be the ‘duty to work’ or the ‘duty to safeguard the unity of a
country’. The justifications for imposing such duties might be found in either political or
economic expediency, which is likely to mean that the ambit of such duties is not constrained
by any associated rights. Hence, when a duty conflicts with a right, its relationship with the
enshrined right will be unclear. For example, would the duty to safeguard the unity of a
country extend to the silencing of all political criticism? Such questions are difficult to answer
in the absence of a right that anchors the duty. Freestanding duties that exist without rightsbased justification will as a consequence not necessarily be subject to limitations required by
enshrined rights.

Contingency and correlativity
It is equally important to be clear about the distinction between correlativity and contingency
in the context of rights and duties. Correlativity exists when a duty can be said to be the
inevitable, logical product of a specific right. However, it does not necessarily follow that our
enjoyment of that same right (or other rights) is contingent on fulfilment of the correlative
duty. Statements about contingency almost always constitute statements about the
conditions upon which rights are to be protected or denied. This is exemplified in the
statement that we must ‘exercise our rights responsibly’. Such a statement is not confined to
asserting the existence of inevitable, logical correlatives of rights, and readily encompasses a
broad range of circumstances as to how a given right should be restricted and when – in
extreme cases – it should be denied. The phrase has the potential to introduce contingency
were it considered justiciable.
It is important to recognise this distinction between correlativity and contingency if we are to
avoid muddying discussions about the proper relationship between rights and duties with
political and moral arguments about the appropriate limits of rights. This danger is particularly
acute where duties are discussed in the absence of any reference to specific rights or any
other explicit or specifically grounding principle. For example, while the claim that all
individuals have a duty to obey the law may on its face appear uncontroversial, it is open to a
number of potentially problematic interpretations. As a consequence, we need to be very

29

clear about where the duty to obey the law comes from, what should happen when it is
breached, and how it relates to the rights we wish to protect. Speaking about the duty to
obey the law independently of rights leaves open the question of contingency and gives rise
to unexamined conclusions about the supposed relationship between specific rights and
duties. For example, it is not inconceivable that some might – incorrectly – conclude that the
failure to discharge a general duty to obey the law should result in a limitation on the right to
due process.
In light of these possibilities, it is essential to be clear about the risks associated with even
rhetorical or aspirational statements about duties. Unless statements about the importance of
duties are grounded in an account of rights that explicitly recognises the distinction between
correlativity and contingency, and place rights and duties in the correct order, then we risk
undermining rights by implying that the fulfilment of duties is an essential prerequisite to the
enjoyment of certain rights.

5.5

Enforcing duties: justiciability

Assuming we recognise the existence of duties and articulating their relationship to rights,
the question then arises as to whether such duties should be legally enforceable. As has
already been noted in chapter 4, it is very rare for states to move from acknowledging the
importance of duties to making them justiciable and directly enforceable. There are three
main reasons why this has been the case.
First, as has already been noted, any move towards a greater emphasis on duties inevitably
raises the spectre of contingency and with it the risk of undermining established human rights
protections. Second, it is unclear as to what kinds of duties can in fact be justiciable. General
duties – such as the duty to obey the law, for example – are simply too broad to be the
subject of meaningful legal action, in part because it would be extremely difficult to define the
limits of such a duty or agree on what the sanction for breach of such a duty would be.
The third and perhaps most compelling reason why the majority of states have avoided
making duties justiciable is because few have seen the need to do so. Most jurisdictions
have well-developed, relatively settled systems of public and private law that govern the
relationships between individuals and between individuals and the state, systems which
typically predate the legal recognition of human rights and the establishment of frameworks
to protect them. For example, the common law doctrine of negligence sets out detailed rules
and principles that determine when a duty is owed, the standard of conduct required in order
to fulfil that duty, and what happens when it is breached. Given that most duties capable of
clear legal definition are already recognised and enforced by law, it is difficult to see what
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would be achieved by formally recognising a set of duties outside the law of torts. Instead,
such a move may lead to confusion – both in the minds of lawyers and the general public –
and place a heavy burden on the courts to determine the limits of any such duties and their
place within existing human rights frameworks.

5.6

Conclusion

Given that most human rights scholars accept that duties are inseparable from rights and
that their observance is crucial to the development and protection of those rights, few would
argue against the recognition of duties per se. That said, it is rare to encounter a call for
those duties to be made explicit or given a substantive legal meaning. Aside from the fact
that such an exercise would be extremely difficult, many commentators are rightly wary of
implying that rights are somehow contingent on duties or responsibilities. No matter how well
intentioned, there is always the possibility that a court or public body may mistake the
statement of a duty as a call for it to be made a precondition for the exercise of a right.
This being the case, the question arises as to what is likely to be achieved through any effort
to set out the duties that attach to particular rights. Although it can be argued that articulating
such duties may help the public to better understand the role played by rights in the legal
system and counter concerns that rights are overly individualistic and undermine social
cohesion, there is always a risk that any statement of duties will become the focus of
attempts to give it legal meaning. Moreover, articulating such duties may also give the false
impression to lay citizens that there is some contingent relationship between rights and
duties. Having identified these risks, the next section will provide a series of concluding
recommendations about how best to approach the question of duties while maintaining a
clear commitment to the centrality of human rights.
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6.

Conclusion

This report has examined the relationship between rights and responsibilities, described the
surrounding debates both in the UK and internationally, and surveyed the duties expressed
in international and domestic law. Although this report is not intended to serve as a direct
response to the proposals contained in the Green Paper, its findings point to a number of
general conclusions that may help to frame any future discussion of the proper role of
responsibilities in the UK.
The first of these conclusions is that many duties are already recognised and enforced
throughout UK law, and they are also implicit in the exercise of rights under the Human
Rights Act. That said, at present there is no general duty to respect the rights of others as
laid out in a number of international treaties and various domestic constitutions. While some
may view such a duty as superfluous, its potential value lies in the fact that it reinforces our
shared commitment to the importance of rights and recognises that the exercise of these
rights should be constrained by respect for other rights. To this extent, the principle gives
expression to the liberal commitment to the priority of rights over duties, while also
reinforcing the idea that we all have a duty to respect the rights of others. Such a duty to
respect the rights of others is to be preferred to a duty to ‘exercise rights responsibly’, which
confuses the moral appeal of living a responsible life with the existence of a legally
enforceable duty. Moreover, to the extent that the law exists to protect individual rights, the
duty to respect the rights of others might also be said to encompass a duty to obey the law.
In this sense, the duty to respect the rights of others may be preferable to the more coercive
and less nuanced obligation to obey the law.
The second conclusion of this report is that there is little to be gained from incorporating lists
of specific duties into any proposed written constitution or Bill of Rights. Instead, this report
suggests that the proper place for any statements about responsibilities is in the preamble to
any such document. This approach not only ensures that such statements are seen as
educative and aspirational but also guards against the risk of misinterpretation and any
suggestion that such duties should be regarded as justiciable and directly enforceable
against individuals.
Finally, this report concludes that if Parliament decides that certain duties should be
incorporated into the main text of any new written constitution or Bill of Rights, then
precautions should be taken to safeguard the commitment to non-justiciability contained in
the Green Paper. In particular, we should avoid including specific or general duties that
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cannot be linked either directly or indirectly to fundamental rights. General clauses should in
particular be avoided on the grounds that they are particularly vulnerable to opening up the
possibility of contingency. In addition, when there is a risk that the wording of a noncorrelative specific duty may give rise to suggestions of contingency, then we must ensure
that the duty is narrowly interpreted and make clear that the ability to exercise the right can
never be constrained by reference to a non-correlative duty. One way to safeguard against
the risks of contingency or direct enforceability is to follow the example of the Indian
Constitution and incorporate a clause expressly stating that duties are not directly
enforceable.
Underpinning all of these conclusions is the idea that the best way to avoid the risks of
contingency is to ensure that duties are based on and derived from rights. Put another way,
any debate on the role of responsibilities must always be conducted in the context of a
continuing and robust commitment to the protection and advancement of fundamental human
rights.
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Appendix 1: Methodology
This report draws on a wide range of international and domestic human rights documents,
government and non-governmental reports, and academic writings. Following an initial
decision to look at both international and national discussions of the relationship between
rights and responsibilities, the authors used a variety of academic databases to produce a list
of available writings on the topic. Among those databases consulted were:
Australian Law Online
Oxford University e-Journals
Electronic Information System for International Law (EISIL)
EurLEX
Europa
European Sources Online
Firstpoint
FLAG (Foreign Law Guide)
Global Legal Information Network (GLIN)
Hansard
HeinOnline
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers
Index to Foreign Legal Periodicals
Index to Legal Periodicals
Justis
LexisNexis Butterworths
Official Document System of the United Nations
Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
United Nations Treaty Collection
Westlaw
WorldLII
Using these databases the authors conducted a systematic literature review based on key
words associated with the key research questions. Initially, the keywords constitutional
duties, constitutional responsibilities, constitutional obligations, international law
duties, international law responsibilities and international law obligations were used.
After reviewing the abstracts of the available literature, the authors narrowed down the
literature selection to pieces that focused on the constitutional duties, responsibilities and
obligations that apply to (or potentially apply to) individuals rather than states.
Based on this initial search, we identified a long list of potentially relevant academic
literature. While a great many of these works touched on the issue of constitutional
responsibilities, in the majority of cases the discussion in question was relatively brief or
confined to jurisprudential discussions of the meaning of duty and obligation. Following a
preliminary reading of these works, however, we were able to identify a number of leading
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books and articles in the field that examine the relationship between rights and
responsibilities in detail. These include:

(1)

Daes, E. (1980) Freedom of the Individual Under Law: A Study on the
Individual’s Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights
and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights;

(2)

Eleftheriadis, P. (2008) Legal Rights;

(3)

Etzioni, A. (1995) The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the
Communitarian Agenda;

(4)

Glendon, M. A. (1991) Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political
Discourse;

(5)

Hodgson, D. (2003) Individual Duty within a Human Rights Discourse;

(6)

Hohfeld, W. N. (1923) Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning;

(7)

Knox, J. (2008) “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 102(1);

(8)

Petrasek, D. (1999) Taking Duties Seriously: Individual Duties in
International Human Rights Law;

(9)

Saul, B. (2000) “In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties,
Obligations and Responsibilities”, 32 Columbia Human Rights Law Review
566;

(10) Selbourne, D. (1994) The Principle of Duty: An Essay on the Foundations
of the Civic Order;

(11) Steiner, H., Alston, P. & Goodman, R. (2007) International Human Rights
in Context: Law, Politics and Morals (3rd ed.);

(12) Sunstein, C. (1995) “Rights and Their Critics”, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 727.
The report develops its analysis at three levels, and the research methodology was adapted
to each. First, at the level of political and ideological analysis, the report examines the origins
of the rise of the responsibilities movement, both internationally and within the UK. The
materials selected in this area were primarily political analysis articles and political
philosophy associated with the responsibilities movement (eg Etzioni, 1995). In addition,
official and NGO publications and records of relevant political debates at the international
and domestic level were especially important in developing an account of the origins of the
responsibilities movement internationally and in the UK.
Second, at the level of legal analysis, the report surveys international law provisions
regarding individual duties, as well as similar examples within domestic jurisdictions. Legal
materials were compiled using secondary literature as an initial guide and also using legal
databases directly. A comprehensive list was compiled of jurisdictions and international law
materials that include references to duties and responsibilities. The authors took the view
that the main international and regional human rights treaties were clearly of significance to
the discussion. Regarding domestic jurisdictions, the authors drew a clear distinction
between jurisdictions with authoritarian characteristics and those that could be classified as
democratic liberal states. While the report notes on several occasions that jurisdictions with
authoritarian regimes have been more likely to include comprehensive lists of responsibilities
and duties in their constitutions, these jurisdictions are not examined in detail here. Rather,
the report takes a closer look at those jurisdictions that the authors determined ‘comparable’
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with the UK. The authors took the view that comparable jurisdictions would need in the first
instance to be characterised as democratic liberal states and should in addition fall under
one of the following inclusion criteria:



Common law jurisdictions;



Member States of the European Union;



Commonwealth jurisdictions;



Anglo-American jurisdictions.

Finally, the report takes a theoretical approach to the idea of responsibilities, drawing on
well-established legal and moral theories on human rights. This part of the report drew most
heavily on analytical literature. The primary inclusion criterion at this level of research was
that of ‘scholastic reputation in the field’, a criterion which was strongly guided by the authors’
professional judgement, developed during long experience of teaching and researching in
the area of human rights and human rights theory. The authors were also particularly
pleased to have leading rights theorists amongst their peer reviewers, who offered extensive
feedback on the field.
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Appendix 2: Key international provisions
This appendix contains extracts from the main international treaties and conventions referred
to in the report. All documents are listed in alphabetical order.

(1)

African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981)

Article 27:
Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally
recognized communities and the international community.

Article 29 specifies the following duties:
1
To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the
cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to
maintain them in case of need;

2

To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual
abilities at its service;

3

Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he
is;

4

To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when
the latter is threatened;

5

To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial
integrity of his country and to contribute to its defence in accordance with
the law;

6

To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes
imposed by law in the interest of the society;

7

To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations
with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and
consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral
well being of society;

8

To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the
promotion and achievement of African unity.

(2)

American Convention on Human Rights (1969)

Article 32:
1
Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, and
mankind.

2

The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security
of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic
society.

The American Convention on Human Rights replaced the:

(2a) American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948)
Article XXVIII - Scope of the Rights of Man
The rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just
demands of the general welfare and the advancement of democracy.
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Chapter two - Duties
Article XXIX - Duties to society
It is the duty of the individual so to conduct himself in relation to others that each and every
one may fully form and develop his personality.

Article XXX - Duties toward children and parents
It is the duty of every person to aid, support, educate and protect his minor children, and it is
the duty of children to honor their parents always and to aid, support and protect them when
they need it.

Article XXXI - Duty to receive instruction
It is the duty of every person to acquire at least an elementary education.

Article XXXII - Duty to vote
It is the duty of every person to vote in the popular elections of the country of which he is a
national, when he is legally capable of doing so.

Article XXXIII - Duty to obey the law
It is the duty of every person to obey the law and other legitimate commands of the
authorities of his country and those of the country in which he may be.

Article XXXIV - Duty to serve the community and the nation
It is the duty of every able-bodied person to render whatever civil and military service his
country may require for its defense and preservation, and, in case of public disaster, to
render such services as may be in his power.
It is likewise his duty to hold any public office to which he may be elected by popular vote in
the state of which he is a national.

Article XXXV - Duties with respect to social security and welfare
It is the duty of every person to cooperate with the state and the community with respect to
social security and welfare, in accordance with his ability and with existing circumstances.

Article XXXVI - Duty to pay taxes
It is the duty of every person to pay the taxes established by law for the support of public
services.

Article XXXVII - Duty to work
It is the duty of every person to work, as far as his capacity and possibilities permit, in order
to obtain the means of livelihood or to benefit his community.

Article XXXVIII - Duty to refrain from political activities in a foreign country
It is the duty of every person to refrain from taking part in political activities that, according to
law, are reserved exclusively to the citizens of the state in which he is an alien.
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(3)

Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1999)

Preamble:
Recognizing the right and the responsibility of individuals, groups and associations to
promote respect for and foster knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the
national and international level.

Article 18(1):
Everyone has duties towards and within the community, in which alone the free and full
development of his or her personality is possible.

Article 18(2):
Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have an important role
to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and
fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic
societies, institutions and processes.

Article 18(3):
Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important
role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of
everyone to a social and international order in which rights and freedoms set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully
realized.

(4)

European Convention on Human Rights (1950)

Article 10:
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television
or cinema enterprises.

2 The exercise of such freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.

Article 17:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in
the Convention.
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(5)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

Preamble:
[T]he individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs,
is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant.

(6)

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (1976)

Preamble:
[T]he individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs,
is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant.

(7)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

Article 29:
1 Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.

2 In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society.
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Appendix 3: Key domestic law provisions
This appendix contains extracts from the main domestic constitutions referred to in the
report. All documents are listed in alphabetical order.

(1)

Australia

Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Act 2004
The fifth preambular clause reads: ‘This Act encourages individuals to see themselves, and
each other, as the holders of rights, and as responsible for upholding the human rights of
others’.

Victorian Charter of Rights and Responsibilities (2006)
The second preambular clause reads: ‘...human rights come with responsibilities and must
be exercised in a way that respects the human rights of others’.

(2)

China

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982), Chapter II: The
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens
Article 33: All persons holding the nationality of the People's Republic of China are citizens
of the People's Republic of China. All citizens of the People's Republic of China are equal
before the law. Every citizen enjoys the rights and at the same time must perform the duties
prescribed by the Constitution and the law.
Article 51: The exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their freedoms and
rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the collective, or upon
the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.
Article 52: It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the unity
of the country and the unity of all its nationalities.
Article 53: Citizens of the People's Republic of China must abide by the constitution and the
law, keep state secrets, protect public property and observe labour discipline and public
order and respect social ethics.
Article 54: It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the
security, honour and interests of the motherland; they must not commit acts detrimental to
the security, honour and interests of the motherland.
Article 55: It is the sacred obligation of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to
defend the motherland and resist aggression. It is the honourable duty of citizens of the
People's Republic of China to perform military service and join the militia in accordance with
the law.
Article 56: It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to pay taxes in
accordance with the law.

(3)

Germany

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (1949)
Article 6: Marriage and the Family; Children Born outside of Marriage
1 Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.

47

2 The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty
primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the
performance of this duty.

3 Children may be separated from their families against the will of their parents
or guardians only pursuant to a law, and only if the parents or guardians fail in
their duties or the children are otherwise in danger of serious neglect.

4 Every mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community.
5 Children born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation with the
same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position
in society as are enjoyed by those born within marriage.

(4)

Cuba

Constitution of the Republic of Cuba (1992)
Article 64: Every citizen has the duty of caring for public and social property, observing work
discipline, respecting the rights of others, observing standards of socialist living and fulfilling
civic and social duties.

(5)

India

Constitution of India (1949)
Part IV-A: Fundamental Duties
Article 51(a) states: It shall be the duty of every citizens of India
a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National
Flag and the National Anthem;

b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national struggle for
freedom;

c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India;
d) to defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so;
e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the
people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional
diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women;

f) to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture;
g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers
and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures;

h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and
reform;

i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence;
j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that
the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement.
Subject to Part IV clause 37
The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles
therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall
be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.
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(6)

Italy

Constitution of the Italian Republic (1947)
[Part 0] Fundamental Principles
Article 4: Work
1 The republic recognizes the right of all citizens to work and promotes
conditions to fulfil this right.

2 According to capability and choice, every citizen has the duty to undertake an
activity or a function that will contribute to the material and moral progress of
society.
Title II: Ethical and Social Relations
Article 29: Marriage
1 The family is recognized by the republic as a natural association founded on
marriage.

2 Marriage entails moral and legal equality of the spouses within legally defined
limits to protect the unity of the family.
Article 30: Parental Duties and Rights
1 Parents have the duty and right to support, instruct, and educate their
children, including those born out of wedlock.

2 The law provides for the fulfilment of those duties should the parents prove
incapable.

3 Full legal and social protection for children born out of wedlock is guaranteed
by law, consistent with the rights of other family members.

4 Rules and limits to determine paternity are set by law.
Article 31: Family
1 The republic furthers family formation and the fulfilment of related tasks by
means of economic and other provisions with special regard to large families.

2 The republic protects maternity, infancy, and youth; it supports and
encourages institutions needed for this purpose.
Article 32: Health
1 The republic protects individual health as a basic right and in the public
interest; it provides free medical care to the poor.

2 Nobody may be forcefully submitted to medical treatment except as regulated
by law. That law may in no case violate the limits imposed by the respect for
the human being.
Article 33: Freedom of Arts, Science and Teaching
1 The arts and sciences as well as their teaching are free.

2 The republic adopts general norms for education and establishes public
schools of all kinds and grades.

3 Public and private bodies have the right to establish schools and educational
institutes without financial obligations to the state.
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4 The law defining rights and obligations of those private schools requesting
recognition has to guarantee full liberty to them and equal treatment with
pupils of public schools.

5 Exams are defined for admission to various types and grades of schools, as
final course exams, and for professional qualification.

6 Institutions of higher learning, universities, and academies have the autonomy
to establish by-laws within the limits of state law.
Article 34: Education
1 Schools are open to everyone.

2 Primary education, given for at least eight years, is compulsory and free of
tuition.

3 Pupils of ability and merit, even if lacking financial resources, have the right to
attain the highest grades of studies.

4 The republic furthers the realization of this right by scholarships, allowances to
families, and other provisions, to be assigned through competitive
examinations.

(7)

Poland

Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997)
Preamble:
Citizens Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good…
Chapter II: The Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of Persons and Citizens (General
Principles – Obligations)
Article 82:
Loyalty to the Republic of Poland, as well as concern for the common good, shall be the duty
of every Polish citizen.
Article 83:
Everyone shall observe the law of the Republic of Poland.
Article 84:
Everyone shall comply with his responsibilities and public duties, including the payment of
taxes, as specified by statute.
Article 85:
1 It shall be the duty of every Polish citizen to defend the Homeland.

2 The nature of substitute service shall be specified by statute.
3 Any citizen whose religious convictions or moral principles do not allow him to
perform military service may be obliged to perform substitute service in
accordance with principles specified by statute.
Article 86:
Everyone shall care for the quality of the environment and shall be held responsible for
causing its degradation. The principles of such responsibility shall be specified by statute.
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(8)

Portugal

Constitution of Portugal (1976), Part I: Fundamental Rights and Duties
Article 12: Principle of Universality
1 All citizens enjoy the rights and are subject to the duties laid down in the
Constitution.

2 Bodies corporate enjoy such rights and are subject to such duties as are
compatible with their nature.
Article 36: Family, Marriage, and Filiation
1 Everyone has the right to found a family and marry on terms of complete
equality.

2 The requirements for and effects of marriage and its dissolution by death or
divorce are regulated by law without distinction as to the form in which the
marriage is or was contracted.

3 Spouses have equal rights and duties with respect to their civil and political
capacity as well as the maintenance and upbringing of their children.

4 Children born out of wedlock may not for that reason be the subject of
discrimination; discriminatory designations of filiation may not be used by the
law or by Government departments.

5 Parents have the right and the duty to bring up and maintain their children.
6 Children are not to be separated from their parents unless the latter fail to
perform their fundamental duties towards the former, and then only by judicial
decision.

7 Adoption is regulated and protected in accordance with the law.
Article 49: Right to Vote
1 All citizens who are over 18 years of age have the right to vote, except for the
incapacities laid down in general law.

2 The exercise of the right to vote is personal and constitutes a civic duty.
Article 64: Health
1 Everyone has the right to protection of his or her health and the duty to defend
and foster it.

2 The right to health protection is to be met by:
a)
b)

A universal and general national health service that, taking into account
the economic and social conditions of the citizens, tending to be free of
charge;
The creation of economic, social, and cultural conditions securing the
protection of children, the young, and the old; the systematic
improvement of living and working conditions; the promotion of physical
fitness and sports in school and among the people; the development of
the people's sanitary education.

3 In order to secure the right to health protection, the State has prime duty to:
a)

Secure the access of all citizens, regardless of their economic condition,
to preventive as well as curative and rehabilitation medical care;
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b) Secure a rational and efficient medical and hospital coverage of the
c)
d)
e)

whole country;
Direct its action towards the socialization of the costs of medical and
medico-pharmaceutical care;
Control and supervise medicine practiced in partnership and privately,
coordinating it with the national health service;
Control and supervise the production, marketing and use of chemical,
biological and pharmaceutical products and other means of treatment
and diagnosis.

4 The national health service has a decentralized management in which the
beneficiaries take part.
Article 66: Environment and Quality of Life
1 Everyone has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced human
environment and the duty to defend it.

2 It is the duty of the State, acting through appropriate bodies and having
recourse to or taking support on popular initiatives, to:

a) Prevent and control pollution, its effects and harmful forms of erosion;
b) Order and promote regional planning aimed at achieving a proper
c)

d)

location of activities, a balanced social and economic development, and
resulting in biologically balanced landscapes;
Create and develop natural reserves and parks and recreation areas and
classify and protect landscapes and sites so as to ensure the
conservation of nature and the preservation of cultural assets of historical
or artistic interest;
Promote the rational use of natural resources, safeguarding their capacity
for renewal and ecological stability.

Article 106: Fiscal System
1 The fiscal system aims at satisfying the financial needs of the State and other
public bodies, as well as a fair partition of the incomes and the wealth.

2 Taxes are created by law, which determines the incidence rates, concessions,
and safeguards for taxpayers.

3 No one may be compelled to pay taxes which have not been created as
provided in the Constitution and whose settlement and collection are not
effected in the forms laid down by law.
Article 116: General Principles of Electoral Law
1 Direct, secret, and regular elections are the general rule in appointing the
members of the elected organs of supreme authority, the autonomous
regions, and local government.

2 Registration of electors is compulsory and permanent and does not serve any
other purpose. There is a single registration system for all elections by direct
universal suffrage.

3 Election campaigns must observe the following principles:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Freedom of propaganda;
Equality of opportunity and treatment for the various candidates;
Impartiality towards candidates on the part of public bodies;
Supervision of vote-counting.
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4 Citizens have the duty to collaborate with the elections administration in the
forms laid down by law.

5 Votes cast are converted into effective suffrage in accordance with the
principle of proportional representation.

6 Acts dissolving corporate organs based on direct suffrage set the date of the
new elections, to be held in the following ninety days and in accordance with
the electoral law in force at the time of dissolution, otherwise the said acts are
legally null and void.

7 The courts are competent to judge the regularity and validity of acts of
electoral procedure.
Article 276: Defence of the Country, Military, and Civic Service
1 The defence of the country is a fundamental right and a fundamental duty of
every Portuguese.

2 Military service is compulsory, for a period and on conditions laid down by law.
3 Persons considered unfit for armed military service perform unarmed military
service or civic service suited to their situations.

4 Conscientious objectors perform civic service of a length and difficulty
equivalent to that of armed military service.

5 Civic service may be established as a substitute for or as a complement to
military service and may be made compulsory by law for citizens not subject to
military service.

6 No citizen may keep or obtain any office in the State or in any other public
body if he fails to perform his military service or civic service, if compulsory.

7 Performance by a citizen of military service or compulsory civic service is
without prejudice to his social security benefits or permanent career.

(9)

South Africa

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)
Section 3(2)(b):
All citizens are equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.

(10) Spain
Constitution of Spain (1978)
Article 30: Military, Civilian, Emergency Duties
1 Citizens have the right and the duty to defend Spain.

2 The law shall determine the military obligations of Spaniards and shall
regulate, with all due guarantees, conscientious objection as well as other
causes for exemption from compulsory military service, and it may, when
appropriate, impose a substitute social service.

3 A civilian service may be established for the accomplishment of objectives of
general interest.

4 The duties of citizens in cases of serious risk, catastrophe, or public calamity
may be regulated by law.
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Article 35: Work
1 All Spaniards have the duty to work and the right to work, to the free election
of profession or office career, to advancement through work, and to a
sufficient remuneration to satisfy their needs and those of their family, while in
no case can there be discrimination for reasons of sex.

2 The law shall regulate a statute for workers.
Article 45: Environment
1 Everyone has the right to enjoy an environment suitable for the development
of the person as well as the duty to preserve it.

2 The public authorities shall concern themselves with the rational use of all
natural resources for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of life
and protecting and restoring the environment, supporting themselves on an
indispensable collective solidarity.

3 For those who violate the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, penal or
administrative sanctions, as applicable, shall be established and they shall be
obliged to repair the damage caused.

(11) Former USSR
The 1936 USSR Constitution contained a list of individual rights followed by a list of
individual duties, including: to respect the rules of socialism; performance of military service;
and maintaining labour discipline (articles 120–33).
The subsequent 1977 USSR Constitution similarly contained a list of individual rights and
individual duties (Chapter 7: The Basic Rights, Freedoms and Duties of Citizens of the
USSR). Article 59 laid down the relationship between rights and duties, stating: ‘Citizens'
exercise of their rights and freedoms is inseparable from the performance of their duties and
obligations’.
Notably, the current Russian Constitution (1993) has removed ‘duties’ from the title of the
section dealing with rights (Chapter 2: Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen) and retains
only individual duties to defend the homeland and to perform military service.
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